Taliban activity in summer 2008

Taliban Analysis

Beginning in June 2008 major Taliban forces engaged in a large scale offensive in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. By the end of August, however, large-scale attacks had virtually ceased, and the Taliban was acting increasingly as though it were vulnerable. This behavior contradicts the conventional wisdom and reporting on the ground, which maintains that the Taliban are resurgent and stronger than ever. I believe the reason for this contradictory behavior is that the Taliban have been victims of their own success, with local commanders gaining more power at the expense of the centralized Taliban command, fracturing the Taliban’s command and control capabilities.

The Taliban began their summer offensive of 2008 with the Kandahar prison break on June 13— a complex, well-coordinated operation to free the 400 Taliban prisoners in the Sarposa prison, demonstrating a sophistication hitherto unseen. The resources involved in this operation suggest that this raid was undertaken as part of a larger strategy by Taliban high command, as the men and material used go beyond what a provincial commander was likely to possess. Further evidence that this was part of a larger strategy implemented by a centralized Taliban high command is found in the events which followed the Sarposa prison-raid, for the Taliban soon dramatically increased their attacks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. They laid siege to towns and districts, and even attempted to overrun US bases. By mid-August, attacks by large formations of Taliban militants against ISAF/US troops had reached levels not seen since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. On August 18, the Taliban attempted to launch a coordinated suicide bomber attack against the main US military base in south-eastern Afghanistan; having failed, they launched an even larger attack the next day.

This seems to have been the peak of the offensive however, for by the end of August Taliban attacks had dramatically decreased in both size and scope. Indeed, the Taliban had begun to act very defensively, almost as though they felt vulnerable. On September 2nd, one of the main factions in Pakistan kidnapped two Chinese engineers for the declared purpose of getting the government to stop its offensive against them; this was the same group which delivered an ultimatum to the NWFP government only one month before. At the same time, the activity of the Taliban in Afghanistan also died down. Since September, there have been no more large scale attacks on patrols, no attempts to take American bases, and no more attempts to take and hold districts. Furthermore in late September the factions of the Taliban signaled they are open to peace talks with the Afghan government. These are not the acts of victorious fighters.

I believe the explanation for this contradictory behavior is that the combination of large losses of regular troops, and a large influx of untrained new recruits, has resulted in local commanders gaining more power at the expense of Taliban high command. Recent reports have indicated that the Taliban experienced great growth during and after their offensive, with the total number of rebels now estimated in the tens of thousands; however they have also indicated that this influx of newly acquired recruits and territory may have overwhelmed the communications and command and control capabilities of the Taliban.[1] Specifically, there may have been a breakdown in the ability of Taliban high command to control local Taliban commanders. Because of the massive influx of new recruits and new territory, local commanders would find themselves with far greater power (and thus more self-sufficient), and as a result would be much less responsive to the instruction of the centralized Taliban leadership. Thus, the centralized command and control capabilities evident in the Sarposa raid would have been significantly degraded, preventing similar operations from occurring on a broad front. At the same time, the summer offensive would have depleted their reserves of trained fighters, leaving them with less of an offensive capability than when they started, but with more authority and control over the land they have. The combination of these two factors then, explains why the summer offensive ended when it did.

Evidence for this is found in attacks in mid-August, which (with the exception of the attack on French troops by non-Taliban insurgents) show considerably less sophistication and planning than those operations conducted in June and July. For example, the attacks on Camp Salerno on August 18th and 19th were ill-coordinated and conducted without discipline, with many of the suicide bombers killing their comrades when their bombs exploded. Contrast this with the attempt to overrun an American outpost in Kunar province on July 13th. During this attack, the Taliban troops showed discipline and acted more as a fighting unit than a mob; for the August 18th and 19th attacks, the opposite held true.
This hypothesis also explains why the Taliban have been behaving somewhat fearfully, as though they do not have the power one expects them to possess after the offensive—because they would not. They would have the potential for that power, but it is not yet realized. On the contrary, the power of the leaders of the Taliban would be weaker than before the offensive—they would have fewer reliable regulars at their command, and their centralized command structure would be shattered, meaning they could not exert much control over Taliban commanders. Thus the infighting and contradictory peace signals from the Taliban—on the one hand, the high command of the Taliban would not wish to engage in peace talks with the Afghani government, as they have gained greater potential forces from the summer offensive; on the other hand, local commanders would have more power now, and might see peace talks as profitable.

If this explanation for Taliban behavior is correct, then it should be expected that the main emphasis of the Taliban for the winter would be on consolidating their forces as well as their command structure. This consolidation could continue for much of the spring, and would likely be tested by another offensive, either late in the spring or early in the summer. Large scale attacks, such as the type which occurred during this past summer offensive, will not be undertaken in a systematic and broad manner until this spring or summer offensive, though they may occur sporadically at the local level. Thus, we should expect that the Taliban will be in a vulnerable position for most of the winter, and only be able to take full advantage of the gains they made in the summer offensive until either the spring or summer of 2009.
[1] Antonio Giustozzi, "The neo-Taliban: A Year On," Open Democracy, December 11, 2008.